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The mutual acknowledgement of intellectual property agreed upon by various states be-
tween 1880 and 1890 inspired the imaginations of contemporaries. In 1889, the Swiss 
Law Professor Friedrich Meili characterised his fellow humans as “mobile global citizens”, 
who could choose their state in accordance with their needs – thanks to the existence 
of international administrative unions.1 In his time, these unions included the Interna-
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tional Telegraph Union of 1865/1868, the Universal Postal Union of 1874, the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886.2 All of them formed nuclei of 
an international economic system, today mostly incorporated in the legal framework of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO).3
This paper examines the process leading to the Paris Convention for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property of 1883,4 and the accompanying formation of the governance structure 
of the international patent regime and its development from 1883 to 1994.
The 110 years between the Paris Convention of 1883 and the TRIPS Agreement of 1994 
can be seen as a time when the industrial society of the late 19th century was developing 
its rules applicable to technical knowledge and transforming them to meet the require-
ments of today’s transnational ‘information society’.5 This process does not only apply 
to national but also to international rules concerning the usage of technical information. 
The focus of the latter issue implies a mutual acknowledgement of national patents by 
transnational rules monitored by international organisations (as long as no ‘world patent’ 
can be applied).
In this sense, one could argue, the history of the formation of the international gover-
nance system protecting intellectual property rights can be seen as a history of properti-
sation. As Hannes Siegrist pointed out in 2006, “interdisciplinary property research poses 
the question of what the optimum mixture of institutions could be for a transition from 
an industrial society to a knowledge and information society, and from a nation state 
order to a European and global order. In order to answer this question, it must extend 
property analysis to include an analysis of the governance of modern societies, interna-
tional systems and transnational networks”.6
Today, the World Trade Organisation is the heart of a multinational trade system that 
strongly regulates the trade laws of 140 states. Intellectual and industrial property rights 
form a part of the WTO’s legal framework. This is evidenced by the fact that the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counter-
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of the WTO.8 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) also underwent sig-
nificant change as a result of this agreement. This was due to the fact that, during the 
Punta del Este Conference in September 1986, the GATT contracting parties had agreed 
on adding trade related aspects of the protection of intellectual property to the subjects 
for negotiations within the GATT:9 Reasons for the inclusions were a halt in negotiations 
over a revision of the Paris Convention, and the perceived need to end the ‘balkani-
sation’ of international trade regulations by harmonising existing treaties and making 
them more effective by means of a further linkage.10 The negotiations of this so-called 
“Uruguay Round” gained momentum when the Iron Curtain fell in 1989 and Eastern 
European countries were considering joining the GATT.
As in 1889, the ratification of the TRIPS Agreement and the revision of the GATT in 
1994 gave rise to visions of a peaceful new world (trade) order. Having experienced the 
recent fall of the Berlin wall, many contemporaries hoped for a peaceful self-regulation 
of autonomous subjects on an international level.11
The development of the international regulation concerning the mutual acknowledge-
ment of patent protection can be seen as a process in which today’s property structure, 
that underlies international trade law and international organisations, has been formed. 
This structure has been discussed a great deal – due mostly to the fact that it displays 
a specific concept of ownership of technical information, formed along the lines of the 
model of private property. Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO and the GATT 
are all still issues of a lively discussion.12
The granting of patent rights13 can be understood as a definition of property rights with 
regard to new technical knowledge for a limited time span.14 During the life of the pat-
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knowledge economically. Other market participants can only gain access to the protected 
‘informational good’15 (i.e. the technical knowledge) on the condition of approval by the 
owner. The latter is usually linked to licences which are granted in exchange for money or 
another type of compensation (e.g. access to other technical knowledge). This makes new 
technical knowledge tradable. With regard to the theory of propertisation, this process 
can be interpreted as a process of commodification of knowledge.
Patents will not protect mere discoveries but are limited in their scope to technical in-
ventions with proven applicability to either products or processes (details may, however, 
differ significantly from country to country16). Unlike the author’s right regarding litera-
ture, paintings and films,17 patent rights require a governmental registration or approval 
procedure (again, details vary from country to country).
In most Western countries, legislation does not limit the granting of patents to new 
products or processes but also makes patents available for new technical applications of 
existing sets of knowledge. Over the last 100 years,18 this possibility has been applied to 
new biochemical and medical applications of existing natural substances (namely after 
the Budapest Treaty of 197719). Some critics view this extension of property rights as 
a means of securing the predominance of the Western property model in the world 
economy.
To give an example, the American law professor Marci A. Hamilton accused the TRIPS 
Agreement of securing a “Western, Protestant-based capitalist copyright”.20 She argues 
that the agreement rests on a bundle of axioms about the rights to information organised 
in a property-like manner which can be characterised according to the following crite-
ria: 1. the individuality of the owner (the Western concepts disagree on the question of 
whether it has to be a natural person21), 2. the limitation of time, 3. the possibility of 
a technical application (instead of knowledge “as such”) and 4. the exploitability of the 
invention instead of the sustainability of knowledge.
As a system can be as controversial as that, it is worth digging further into its construc-
tion and its history (II.). After this, the question will be posed of whether and to what ex-
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as a history of propertisation, and what conclusions can be drawn from the answer to this 
question (III.). However, before exploring the historical dimensions of the international 
patent system we will briefly analyse the paradoxes underlying the problematic relation-
ship between propertisation and international patent protection.
Propertisation and internationalisation of patent rights
The term ‘propertisation’ can be interpreted in a twofold way: as a process of ongoing 
commodification, a narrative of industrial society and – moreover – of the ‘information 
society’, where technical information becomes tradable, subjected to property rights and 
traded by licences.22 However, ‘propertisation’ can also be seen as a heuristic category 
with which to analyse the governance structure regarding rights to information in a 
society. Is it organised in a more ‘liberally exclusive’ or ‘liberally inclusive’23 way: does it 
– for instance – allow the state to interfere with compulsory licences for the benefit of 
the community? The specific answer to this question invites conclusions about a society 
– as the social responsibility clause concerning the property right in Art. 14 of the Ger-
man constitution can be seen as a constitutional indicator for the German state as being 
a social market economy.
The internationalisation of patent protection, therefore, reveals a serious problem, be-
cause it prevents states from setting up rules concerning technical information com-
pletely autonomously. As will be discussed at the end of this paper, this can be a serious 
problem for less developed countries24 when it comes to the patent protection of medi-
cation. The most prominent example of this is the protection of patent rights of AIDS 
medicine in these countries, imposed by mutual acknowledgements ruled by the WTO 
and the TRIPS Agreement. Although the Declaration of Doha in 200125 made some 
gains for the less developed countries, concerning for instance the possibility of granting 
compulsory licences, the ambiguous nature of these agreements has been revealed: After 
the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’ and the end of competition between different economic sys-
tems, it is unlikely that states will be able to develop from an “imitation industry” to an 
“innovation” industry26 without being a member of the WTO. On the other hand, such 
agreements limit their sovereignty in specific regards that can be crucial to their social 
health care. The Paris Convention had its roots in the heterogeneous structure of the pat-
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part in the developing of international commerce in the course of the industrial revolu-
tion. While in 1883 these countries were Germany, Austria and Switzerland, the TRIPS 
Agreement affects African and Asian states that want to be part of the world economy. 
The difference is that in 1883, the less developed countries had more opportunities with 
which to influence the regulations (although the example of the German Empire, which 
did not join the Paris Convention until 1903, already demonstrates the problems in-
volved with harmonising patent systems in the late 19th and early 20th centuries27).
Seen from a propertisation perspective, the interrelationship of patent rights to free trade 
is a theoretical problem. When propertisation is seen as a heuristic category with which 
to analyse the underlying property structure of a community or state, the existence of 
patents is completely connected to a state that can grant a patent (or to the international 
treaties integrating these national patent systems). Therefore, visions of a globalised com-
munity are often combined with a critical view of patent protection.28 Patent rights are 
first of all national rights. As patent protection ends on the respective border line, on 
the other hand, export and import are hindered. This can be explained by the free-rider 
model of institutional economics. Inventions resemble public goods as they are hard to 
protect and will not diminish when they are used.29 What will decrease, however, is their 
commercial exploitability. Thus, inventors in further developed states will not export 
their goods to less developed states until they are able to guarantee them their inventions 
will be protected against imitation.30 This fact can be termed the paradox of patent pro-
tection: Patents can function as a non-tariff impediment to commerce on the one hand, 
because they can be used against the import of goods violating the patent right of the 
owner. On the other hand, the non-existence of patent rights or a similar protection of 
foreign inventions will also act as a non-tariff impediment to commerce, because no one 
will export highly advanced technology or for instance medicine into that country. This 
is the very dilemma which developing states are confronted with nowadays. The histori-
cal answers to this paradox shall consequently be further analysed.
II. The development of an international patent regime
The harmonisation of patent protection was a highly controversial topic that was com-
pletely connected to the formation of the industrial society, displayed at global exhibi-
tions.31 Since the Great Exhibition of 1851 promised to unify the industrial products 
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glimpse of a “new world”32 of progress, peace and harmony. However, the promised land 
which the admirers of the exhibitions seemed to enter did not retain its innocence for 
a long time. The “fetish commodity” (as the philosopher Walter Benjamin put it)33 did 
not only demand adoration, it also produced manifest greed. The promised “peaceful 
competition of nations”34 exposed a certain nationalistic subtext.35
The newly invented substances of the dyestuff industry, for instance, amazed visitors to 
the Global Exposition of Paris in 1867. They admired the “mighty, metallic glimmering 
block of the ‘Violet de Paris’ and, beside it, the new intermediate products of the dye-
stuff industry, the methylated and ethylated anilines”.36 The new inventions nonetheless 
proved to be extremely vulnerable. This was as a result of the simplicity of imitation of 
knowledge37 and the difficulties involved in finding out about such a deed. Furthermore, 
the vulnerability of intellectual property rights was accompanied by a still insufficient 
and heterogeneous form of protection of literary and industrial authorship by the coun-
tries displaying their products. The possibilities of protection proved to be even weaker 
with regard to inventions by citizens from foreign countries. In the age of mercantilism, 
many countries granted patents to the first importer of foreign inventions. These so-
called “import patents” could subsequently even prevent the first inventor from selling 
his goods in the related country.38
Patent rights are granted by the country. The country allows a patentee to exploit his 
invention for a limited time and prevents anybody on his territory from using the same 
invention for commercial purposes or from importing goods that are produced violating 
these rights. Therefore, patents function as non-tariff impediments to imports of certain 
goods, as has previously been outlined.
Consequently, and due to the fact that patents were derived from monopolies, both pos-
sibilities have been discussed: both the internationalisation of patents and their abolition 




















From the Paris Convention (1883) to the TRIPS Agreement (1994) | 53
rights took place in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland 
during the time of the Industrial Revolution. In the “liberal era” of the 19th century, mo-
nopolies were worked against in all of these countries. While in Great Britain the Statute 
of Monopolies of 162439 was initially adapted by jurisdiction to the needs of industrialisa-
tion, the French and American model opted for a foundation of the inventor’s right in 
their constitutions and their patent legislation. All three models, however, went back to 
the philosophy of John Locke, who declared everything one could form with one’s hands 
or mind to be the property of the one who formed it.40 Immanuel Kant and Johann Got-
tlieb Fichte construed an individual right to one’s ideas and inventions not unlike this 
justification.41
In Germany, nonetheless, the “crisis of patent protection” went deeper.42 This applied 
even more to Switzerland and the Netherlands, where patent legislation was altogether 
abandoned for a certain period. Other models of constructing rights to new technical 
information (which patents are) can be conceived: unhindered access, collective owner-
ship of knowledge, sustainability instead of exploitability, unlimited access to knowledge 
instead of ownership for a limited time.43 Nonetheless, simplifications and mystifica-
tions have to be avoided. The limited time span of patents in the Western model is, 
for instance, already a compromise between societal and individual interests. Technical 
knowledge is held in common after the protected time span, not lost.
The anti-patent tendency was motivated by the idea of infinite scientific progress. Ac-
cording to the view of leading free-trade economists, technological progress was self-
inductive, and the role of inventors and engineers consisted merely in picking the fruits 
of new techniques as soon as they were ripe.44 Patents, by contrast, appeared to be the 
rotten fruits which only reduced the yield of a wholesome harvest. Thus a member of the 
German free-trade movement predicted in 1863: “Patents are ripe to fall and be recog-
nised more and more as a foul fruit hanging from the tree of human culture.”45 To their 
opponents, therefore, patents, which excluded others from the commercial utilisation 
of an idea, merely appeared to be a reminder of the old-fashioned viewpoint that the 
government should direct the economy.
Following a lengthy discussion on the pros and cons of patent rights, which developed 
in the middle of the 19th century, it was finally concluded that the advantages (in most 
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countries: temporary and conditional) of bestowing industrial property rights out-
weighed their drawbacks.46
1. The Paris Convention of 1883
The urge to reach an international agreement on the treatment of exhibits was primarily 
felt when American firms threatened to boycott the Global Exposition of Vienna, which 
was to be held in 1873. In September 1871, the programme of the planned Global Ex-
position had been published, translated into all languages and distributed to all the na-
tions existing in 1871.47 However, the American inventors and enterprises only wanted 
to display their inventions in a country where the exhibits were protected in accordance 
with American standards.48
Thus, the Austrian government enacted a regulation that allowed the displayed inven-
tions to be protected for the whole of 1873, when the exposition was to be held. In 
addition, an international patent congress was held with the aim of setting up an in-
ternational and general code for the protection of exhibits during global expositions. It 
took place in Vienna between 4 and 8 August 1873, in the conference programme of the 
exhibition.49 158 participants attended the conference.50
The congress agreed on setting minimum requirements for ‘reasonable’ patent law, which 
all ‘civilised nations’ had to enact. Secondly, they agreed to advise all these nations to 
form an international union which would guarantee any citizen of its member states 
equal treatment to the inhabitants of any other member state.
To enforce its resolutions, the congress installed an executive committee. It consisted of 
the Vienna conference’s preparatory committee and several international experts. It was 
instructed to hold a new congress on the matter whenever it seemed to be favourable. 
Moreover, the participants were invited to form national sections.
In the course of the preparations for the 1878 Global Exposition in Paris, a confer-
ence on the protection of the exhibits became part of the conference programme again. 
The second International Congress on the Protection of Industrial Property convened in 
Paris from 5 to 17 September, 1878. It unified 500 participants from countries, profes-
sional associations, chambers of commerce and other organisations coming from even 
more countries than those that had attended the Vienna conference.51 The conference 
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members agreed on an envisaged protection of three sections of industrial property (for 
the protection of designs and models and the section for trademarks and commercial 
names). It was modelled on the Universal Postal Union (Union postale universelle, UPU) 
which had first been founded under the name General Postal Union in Berne in 1874 
by 22 signatory states.52 
The congress installed a permanent commission which was vested with full power to 
induce negotiations with the national governments and to hold new conferences. As 
soon as the managing French section had drafted a proposal for an international section, 
it was discussed within the national sections. After the alterations had been worked on 
by the French section, the modified draft was submitted to all interested foreign govern-
ments in 1880 and the French government invited the interested foreign governments to 
a diplomatic conference. At this conference, which convened in Paris in March 1883, the 
modified draft was discussed. It again underwent several alterations. Most importantly, a 
common patent law for all countries finally proved to be impossible. However, a union 
was created which had to guarantee any citizen of its member states equal treatment to 
the inhabitants of any other member state. It appeared problematic that at least two 
countries which were willing to join the union did not have their own patent law: the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. The convention only stated a merely “moral” obligation53 
to enact a patent law. Although this obligation was later combined with considerable 
economic pressure from the other member states, it took Switzerland several years before 
it finally enacted a patent law in 1888 and the Netherlands even longer, until 1910. On 
March 20 1883, Belgium, Brazil, Spain, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Salvador, Serbia and the Swiss Federation finally signed a treaty which came into 
force after the ratification documents had been exchanged on July 7 1884.
The most important article of the convention dealt with mutual acknowledgement of 
industrial property rights (Article 2 of the convention).54 Another important point con-
cerned the priority right. In order to facilitate the application procedure, the inventor 
had to be granted a certain period during which he could decide whether he wished to 
apply for a patent for the same invention in any of the other member states. During this 
period, a valid patent could not be awarded to any other applicant (Article 4 section 1 
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related to the treatment of exhibits at global exhibitions, this issue was settled in Article 
11 of the convention.55 
2. Further development up to the Second World War
The union additionally installed its own law enforcement agency. An International Bu-
reau for the Protection of Industrial Property was founded, according to Section 13 Subsec-
tion 1 of the Paris Convention. This bureau was set up in Berne, financed by the member 
states of the union and managed by the Swiss Department for Commerce and Agricul-
ture. The bureau collected data from the member states. In its periodical La Propriété 
Industrielle it informed readers about the latest developments concerning the protection 
of industrial property (e.g. new national patent regulations) from 1885 onwards. After 
the Agreement concerning the International Registration of Marks was signed in Madrid in 
1891,56 the bureau was also mandated to register trademarks on an international basis. 
In 1892, it began to publish the newly registered trademarks in its journal Les Marques 
Internationales. In 1893, the bureau merged with the agency of another convention. 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights of 188657 ensured 
literary authorship would be respected. As the Berne Convention had also set up an In-
ternational Bureau in Berne to carry out administrative tasks, these bureaus were united 
in 1893 under the title of United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (BIRPI).
The Paris Convention provided an option for other countries to join (article 16). Up 
until the First World War, this invitation was accepted by many of them. The British 
government, which had to struggle with some opposition to the ratification act, declared 
it would join the union in 1884, as did Ecuador and Tunisia. Although Ecuador and 
Salvador then left the union in 1886, and Guatemala likewise in 1894, the conven-
tion was soon ratified by Norway and Sweden (1885), the United States of America 
(1887), the Dutch part of India (1888), Surinam and Curaçao (1890), New Zealand 
and Queensland (1891), Denmark (1894) and Japan (1899). The Dominican Republic, 
however, joined the union in 1884, left it in 1889 and re-joined in 1890. However, the 
German and Austro-Hungarian Empires did not initially join the union. Although this 
was seemingly contradictory, considering that German engineers had been among the 
strongest promoters of an international agreement around 1873, the German trade as-
sociations were ambiguous with regard to joining the union. This was due to the fact 
that the inner structure of the union was modelled along the lines of the French patent 
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ciation for harmonizing intellectual property legislation which had initiated the Vienna 
conference on patent protection could be seen to have lost their influence. Therefore, 
the German Federal Government opted – following the advice of leading industrialists 
– for the ‘classical’ style of having mutual trade agreements with specific countries. Soon, 
however, the policy of bilateral agreements proved to be inadequate. Serious differences 
between German and Swiss dyestuff producers, which mostly ended up in court, caused 
the representatives of the modern German industries, namely the chemical industry, to 
change their view. After the United States had joined the International Union in 1887, 
the statutes of the latter were discussed once more. They were then changed, in two 
distinctive aspects, in favour of the German patent system. Germany finally joined the 
union in 1903, and Austria and Hungary in 1909.
Since the Paris Convention only provided for mutual recognition of national patents but 
no common patent of its own, several initiatives were carried out for further harmonisa-
tion of patent legislation (“loi uniforme”). This vision of a universal ‘global patent’58 or 
‘global trademark’ came to a preliminary end during the First World War. Nonetheless, 
attempts were resumed after the war. The Paris Convention was formally reinstalled in 
accordance with Article 286 of the Versailles Treaty.59
During the interwar years, the international patent system was further developed. The 
convention of The Hague in 1925, for instance, was concerned with harmonising the 
time span of patent protection (15 years). Transnational debates affected the ‘droit moral’ 
of employed inventors.60
3. Setting up the GATT and the negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994
The Second World War introduced new actors onto the stage of international patent 
harmonisation. New regimes concerned with international trade policy were installed, 
initially competing with the WIPO until the latter system was integrated into the for-
mer. Starting with the Atlantic Charta of 1941, international relations, following an 
US-American initiative, underwent formalisation and institutionalisation. This applied 
to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the World Bank in 1944 and, 
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establishment of an International Trade Union (ITU), but this project was abandoned 
in 1950. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that had been drafted as a 
preliminary settlement in order to prepare the International Trade Union was then tak-
ing the part of a quasi-constitution of the international trade policy. With the founda-
tion of the World Trade Organization, the international trade policy was finally given a 
formal constitution in 1995. The Treaty of 1994 that enacted that settlement contained 
some new agreements as appendices. One of them was the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeiting Goods (the afore-
mentioned TRIPS Agreement) of 1994.
In 1994, the WIPO entered into an agreement with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) which was derived from the international organisation formed by the Agreement 
on General Tariffs and Trades (GATT). The reasons for this development have already 
been touched on at the outset of this article: During the Conference in Punta del Este, 
the leaders of the member states of the WTO were looking for ways in which to make 
the WTO more effective. One of the possible measures was by integrating regulations 
concerning intellectual property rights into the WTO framework which had been left 
out previously. The reasons for the integration of the Paris Convention have been men-
tioned above: The establishment of the WTO resulted from a movement of bundling 
the different pluri- and multilateral trade agreements under one umbrella organization: 
the WTO. This situation caused problems due to the fact that most trade conflicts are 
affected by questions of (technical) information in one way or another in an ‘information 
society’. Nonetheless, it has to be stated that the Uruguay round left the initial mandate 
given to it at the conference in Punta del Este: Initially, this was only seeking to combat 
imitations of products, but the members of the Uruguay round extended their negotia-
tions to setting up rules for trade related aspects of intellectual property rights.62 This 
procedure evokes memories of the setting up procedure of the Paris Convention at the 
international patent congresses of Vienna (1873) and Paris (1878).
According to the WTO Agreement (Section II Subsection I), this organisation will now 
supply the organisational framework for the trade relationships of its member states. 
Furthermore, the organisation, with its seat in Geneva, has the competence to administer 
related trade agreements (Section III Subsection 1 of the WTO Agreement) and provide 
a panel for negotiations (Section III Subsections 2 and 3) and a Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (Section III Subsection 4). The broad competences of the WTO lead to a 
linkage of the different subsections of the WTO and their organs.63
The so-called TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeiting Goods) in 1994 enhanced the obligations 
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ment of April 15 1994, which came into force on January 1 1995,64 obliged its member 
states to comply with the most important articles (Art. 1-12 and 19) of the Paris Con-
vention. Furthermore, it stated stronger minimum requirements for patent protection 
systems (duration of 20 years counted from the filing date (Art. 33 TRIPS Agreement)). 
The TRIPS Agreement forms annex 1 C of the legal framework of the World Trade 
Organisation.65 It requires its member states to keep minimum standards regarding pat-
ent protection, including protection of pharmaceutical products.66 The last requirement 
is related to the fear of industrialised nations regarding re-imports of medical prod-
ucts from less developed countries that could (ordered via internet etc.) easily find their 
way back into the industrialised nations when imported by less developed countries 
without taking their patent protection into consideration. As outlined previously, the 
TRIPS Agreement thus concerned a point that is crucial to any state and even more so 
to African countries, whose populations are strongly affected by the AIDS disease: the 
national health system.67 Respecting the requirements of the TRIPS agreement, which 
those states need to catch up with the international trade networks, necessary for export 
and import, imposes restrictions on those countries in solving one of their most crucial 
domestic problems, namely by making cheap imports of medicine available – while at 
the same time endangering a sustainable import (and as a result of the strong reciproc-
ity principle:68 export) policy. Here, the disadvantages of joining international treaties 
expose a loss of sovereignty, which can – as demonstrated by this extreme example – not 
only strongly impact the trade policy but by means of reflection also other policies in the 
signatory states.
In order to at least deal with some of the relevant problems, the Declaration of Doha of 
200169 was negotiated. In this Declaration, the member states of the WTO declared 
their concern regarding the implications of patent protection on the prices of medicine. 
Furthermore, they agreed on some official interpretations of the TRIPS concerning the 
right of the member states to grant compulsory licences. States can grant such licences to 
enterprises under certain circumstances when the patent owner does not voluntarily give 
a licence. These licences have to be financially compensated by the recipient, whereas 
the fee is fixed by the state. The problem in African countries, however, consists in the 
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industry – and then the import question is raised again. In this case, the Declaration of 
Doha provides a panel in which the related problems between the states affected can be 
discussed: the “TRIPS Council”.
Although the Declaration of Doha cleared some points and provided a new conflict 
regulation, many points were still unsettled: The TRIPS Agreement opted not for a 
uniform patent law but for a guarantee of minimum requirements (Art. 1.1 TRIPS). 
However, those requirements were construed according to the needs of the industrialised 
countries. By extending the TRIPS negotiations from an anti-piracy policy to a more 
integrative settlement, the Western standards were taken as a measure for “minimum 
requirements”.70 Art. 4(b) of the TRIPS Agreement distributed the advantages of the 
agreement in favour of the industrialised countries. The overall principles of the TRIPS 
agreement, the “most-favoured nation treatment” “inhabitant-similar”71 patent protec-
tion, could be limited when it came to intellectual property rights safeguarded by the 
Rome Convention. The result was that not all member states’ citizens but only those 
of member states guaranteeing a similar patent protection could profit from a specific 
intellectual property protection in another member state (exemption from the “most-
favoured nation treatment” of Art. 4).72
This regulation is perhaps the crucial point that distinguishes the TRIPS Agreement 
from the Paris Convention: The Paris Convention set out a mere moral obligation to set 
up a patent legislation in accordance with its principles (and even set up its international 
bureau in Switzerland that did not have a patent legislation at that time). The TRIPS 
Agreement departed from this principle and set out a basic reciprocity. This principle de-
rives from the revised Berne Convention73 but is, when it comes to patent conventions, 
a fallback to the period of mercantilism.
III. A History of propertisation?
The international system regarding trade-related intellectual property rights developed 
between 1883 and 1994. The first step in this development was an acknowledgement 
of the economic benefits (not necessity) of patent protection after the discussion during 
the liberal era regarding other possibilities such as an unimpeded common use of new 
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the new profession of engineers and Prussian economists, who mostly favoured other 
forms of distributing technical knowledge, can illustrate this debate.74 The next step was 
the option of mutual acknowledgement of patent protection between states, not only 
by mutual trade negotiations or treaties but also by an international convention, the 
Paris Convention. This decision helped the international trade system to develop and 
helped economic growth during industrialisation75 by safeguarding certain prerequisites 
for import and export and thus for industrial research. This development can be seen as 
a process of propertisation.
However, did this development necessarily lead to an individual, time-limited property 
right or – in Hamilton’s words – a “Western, Protestant-based capitalist copyright”?76 Yes 
and no. On the one hand, as demonstrated above, the TRIPS Agreement declared many 
elements of the patent law of an industrialised society to be “minimum requirements”, 
which poses enormous problems for less developed countries. The central problem is 
how to safeguard these requirements with a strong reciprocity principle. In this regard, 
Hamilton is certainly right. On the other hand, certain doubts arise regarding the aspect 
of Protestantism. Rather than Protestantism, the governance set regarding technical in-
formation is based on the individual rights of the Enlightenment and the French Revolu-
tion, which declared the ideas of the author and inventor to be his “property”. This con-
cept goes back to the philosophy of John Locke who declared everything one could form 
with one’s hands or mind to be the property of the one who formed it.77 The discussion 
during the Enlightenment, namely by Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, stressed 
the individual right as being the foundation of the right to one’s ideas and inventions. 
Thus, the foundation of the Western model of intellectual property law is influenced not 
so much by Protestantism as by the Enlightenment which in certain regards opposed the 
traditional property structure of the Catholic Church. According to Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno, the Enlightenment had a dialectic structure.78 While it enabled the 
individual against despotism on the one hand, it established a property structure which 
Crawford B. Macpherson, in his famous critique of John Locke, called “possessive individu-
alism”.79 Thus the new, Enlightenment-based property structure – including intellectual 
property rights – is inclusive and exclusive at the same time. Inclusive, when it involves 
the rights of the citizen (and one could go further into the question of which citizens are 
meant, male, female etc.) and exclusive, when it involves property and possession. After 
all, the system is not specifically Protestant but “individual”, or perhaps, along the lines 
of Macpherson, “possessively individual”.
When regarded as based on a human right, as the Enlightenment argued, an intellectual 
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of space is related to that of time. Intellectual property rights in an internationally inter-
linked economy have an inherent tendency to be expanding. And this expansion is two-
fold. On the one hand, it wishes to acquire more and more topics under its command. 
On the other hand, it wishes to leap over the limits of states and territories. With regard 
to the first point, more and more material is assumed under its regime. As can be seen, 
patent protection – although widely discussed – increasingly tends to dominate “white 
landmarks” that nobody previously considered to be “white”, for instance the genetic 
information of creatures, the knowledge of healing processes or the source code of a 
computer program. 
This tendency is the subject of fierce debate. However, in our opinion a distinction has 
to be made again between two points. With the German law professor Thomas Dreier, a 
first group of cases, which are made the object of intellectual property rights, has to be 
identified: namely, those arising when new technologies allow new possibilities of imita-
tion and new possibilities of protection are called for by at least some of the providers of 
information that have invested their time or money in the development.80 And here, it 
can be seen that new information and new possibilities pose the question of their prop-
erty structure – however this will be solved for the specific case.
Another case has to be distinguished from this one, concerning knowledge or material 
that has previously existed but not been regarded as a possible object of intellectual prop-
erty rights until a certain point of technology or foreign intervention occurred. Examples 
of this are the methods of healing that are conserved by indigenous people and also, even 
though the methods of deciphering are new, the genetic information of plants used dur-
ing this healing process.81 In this case, the question of ascribing common knowledge to a 
specific person, even when he or she develops a new technical or medical application for 
it, is a different one and should be treated with the utmost sensitivity.
The Declaration of Doha was not far-reaching enough because it did not chance a strict 
reciprocity principle. However, from a propertisation perspective it can provide hints as 
to what a prospective international governance structure regarding intellectual property 
rights could look like. When it comes to rights to technical information, the governance 
structure does not necessarily have to be either “common” or “individual”. Both gov-
ernance structures mark two poles of a continuum in which different variants can be 
imagined. The granting of compulsory licences, for instance, opens up a possibility of 
designing a more ‘liberally inclusive’82 governance structure of property rights, which is 
in some respects analogous to the social responsibility clause concerning the property 
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And now, the propertisation perspective shall give way to more than an analysis of the 
existing structure of the international property rights system. If understood not only as 
a heuristic category but also as a political programme,83 it demands the formulation of a 
separate vision for the future of international patent protection.
Thus, taking all precautions into consideration, a separate vision for this future shall be 
formulated: The idea of a social responsibility of intellectual property rights can be, in 
our opinion, also be applied to international trade relations. Nowadays (even given the 
background of the historical development) there is hardly any alternative for lesser and 
the least developed countries to try to take part in the international trade system. On the 
other hand, ways have to be sought (and the Declaration of Doha was too inadequate) 
in order to enable the developing and lesser and least developed countries to take an ac-
tive part in the international system. Measures have to be conceived that either affect the 
patent system, for instance more freedom for specific national solutions in countries that 
are specifically suffering from AIDS and/or other measures to help those countries to 
become partners in international trade relations, e.g. more favourable import regulations 
concerning their (e.g. textile) products, maybe additionally financial aids in order to help 
enterprises from those countries to develop (maybe by meso-credits analogous to micro-
credits). Then, there will be a chance that Meili’s visionary words of “global citizens” in 
the sense of enabled “citoyens” can at least begin to come true.
83	 Ibid.
